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1 Introduction
Currently, much of Asia is growing at a very
impressive rate, with the Bank for International
Settlements (BIS 2005a) reporting growth for the
whole region of 7.8 per cent in 2004 and estimating
growth of 7.2 per cent in 2005. This is allowing for a
very significant reduction in poverty. Continued high
growth is crucial from a perspective of poverty
reduction, as the number of poor people in Asia
remains very large and they comprise a high
proportion of the world’s poor. Also, though most
Asian countries have very dynamic growth, there are
several exceptions.
One of the potential important risks that could
undermine continued growth and poverty reduction
in Asia is a financial crisis, especially if it spread
through contagion from one country to another
and/or if it occurred in a major country. The financial
and development costs of the 1997/8 East Asian crisis
were massive.
The current prospects for a new financial crisis
appear to be low for most of Asia. Many countries in
the region have very strong macroeconomic
fundamentals, and policy makers are actively seeking
to continue making progress in overcoming potential
remaining sources of vulnerability, e.g. in the banking
sector. They have also built very strong defences for
preventing future currency crises in the form of
extremely high foreign exchange reserves. However,
important weaknesses do remain while new
challenges are being added, linked for example to
the liberalisation of the domestic financial sectors,
opening up to foreign banks, growth of the
derivatives markets and possible further liberalisation
of the capital account. Furthermore, new shocks can
come either from within Asian countries (e.g.
political instability) or from the international
economy (e.g. a rapid slowdown of the global
economy).
To summarise, as Asian policy makers learned only
too well, the negative impacts of crisis on growth
and poverty reduction are horrendous. Therefore, it
is very important to minimise the risk of crises
occurring as much as possible. It is often during good
times, when excessive risks can be assumed, that
future crises are hatched. However, during good
times it is also easiest to take measures to reduce
the likelihood of future crises.
In this article, we will first estimate the total losses in
output caused by the East Asian crisis. We will then
look at sources of strength and vulnerability in Asian
economies. We will focus much more on China, not
necessarily because it is more vulnerable to crisis, but
because its scale and dynamism makes it so important
for the rest of the region (and the world). China is
also the focus because it is and will be undergoing
important changes, such as the opening up of the
banking system to foreign banks under World Trade
Organization (WTO) commitments. However,
references will also be made to other Asian countries.
The final section will outline some of the key policy
issues for reducing the likelihood of financial crises.
This article focuses on the need to reduce financial
vulnerability to avoid costly crises that can be so
damaging to growth and poverty reduction. Clearly
there are other equally or more important issues for
poverty reduction that escape the scope of this
article. These relate to how in ‘normal times’ the
financial sector can contribute more to ‘pro-poor’
growth.
A major challenge is to improve access to formal
financial services for vast categories of the
population who are currently either totally excluded
or have very limited access to such services, so as to
generate employment and increase income. This is
particularly important in rural areas (IFAD 2001), for
the informal sector, for small and medium
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enterprises (SMEs) and for young entrepreneurs. A
three-pronged approach is required. First, incentives
may need to be provided and regulations may need
to be modified to encourage banks to expand their
activities towards these customers. This is a complex
task. A concrete example is the need to adapt the
implementation of Basle II banking regulations
within Asian economies, so they do not introduce
further biases against lending to SMEs (see
Gottschalk 2005). For the former, credit guarantee
schemes can be effective in promoting changes in
bank lending behaviour if: (a) specific factors for
success exist – such as an open, competitive banking
environment (DFID 2005) and (b) the guarantee
schemes are well designed so they do not, for
example, imply excessive contingent liabilities for
governments or donors, or cover the totality of the
risk (Griffith-Jones and Fuzzo de Lima 2006).
Second, microfinance institutions can play a useful
complementary role in providing access to credit for
very small entrepreneurs (for a recent comprehensive
review, see Helms and CGAP 2006; for a very good
earlier discussion, see Hulme and Mosley 1997). Asia
has a rich and pioneering experience in such
microfinance institutions that can be further
developed, for example, by a more supportive
regulatory framework.
Third, where there are clear cases of market failure or
temporary gaps, there may be a case for public
intervention. Examples of relevant market failures to be
addressed are information asymmetries, high initial
transaction costs of lending to SMEs and/or the need
to develop financial expertise by the small or micro-
businesses. These interventions are perhaps most
effective when they are time-limited and are linked to
institutional developments that can then be
implemented in a sustainable way by the private
financial sector. For example, government or donor
intervention can facilitate microfinance institutions to
grow and this can ideally attract banks into
microfinance. Such interventions can also take place
through private–public partnerships, especially to
finance infrastructure that in certain sectors can provide
an important expansion of services for the poor.
2 Costs of crises
The costs of excessive financial instability leading to
crises are massive. A key cost is forgone output. Here
we estimate the output loss of the four Asian
countries hardest hit by the financial crisis of 1997:
Box 1 Methodological approach for calculating output loss
Output loss caused by financial crises can be measured in a variety of ways. First, one can quantify the
loss of output incurred during the crisis period. Alternatively, one can measure the cumulative output
loss that occurs over time due to a lower output level or trend during and after a crisis episode.
Cumulative output loss, in turn, can be measured either by summing up the annual difference between
potential growth rates and observed growth rates, or by summing up the differences in output levels
(Hoggarth and Saporta 2001). Previous studies have attempted to estimate cumulative output loss
resulting from financial crises by looking at the difference between growth rates (e.g. IMF 1998; 
Aziz et al. 2000). However, Hoggarth and Saporta (2001) correctly point out that measuring the
difference in output levels rather than growth rates leads to a better estimate of the actual loss of
output incurred. Accordingly, they suggest a methodological approach for the former type of
measurement.
We estimate cumulative output loss by measuring the difference in output levels, thus adopting a
methodological approach similar, although not exactly the same, as that suggested by Hoggarth and
Saporta (2001). Specifically, we measure the cumulative difference between projected potential
output and actual output over the years, starting from the first crisis year. Potential output is
represented by the country’s output trend in the years preceding a major crisis episode. The period
upon which the output trend is based is 1991–6 – six years in total (other studies calculate their trends
over a shorter pre-crisis period, between three and five years; see Hoggarth and Saporta 2001). The
use of a six-year period is intended to reduce the possibility of overestimating the output trend in
those cases where growth accelerates in the years immediately preceding the crisis episode. The
output trend corresponds to the fitted values of a linear regression of the real GDP level variable
regressed on a time trend plus a constant. All estimated trends have a high degree of fitness.
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand. Just for these
countries for the 1997–2002 period, we estimate a
total output loss of US$917 billion, which is an annual
average of around US$150 billion for that period.
Table 1 shows output losses for each of the four
countries under consideration. It shows that the
largest losses were incurred by Indonesia, and the
smallest by Malaysia. However, these are losses in
absolute terms, thus not adjusted by the gross
domestic product (GDP) sizes of their economies.
The cumulative output loss corresponds to 72 per
cent of the combined GDPs of the four countries for
the year 2002, and to 40 per cent of East Asia’s
total GDP for the same year.
The output losses reflect lower growth rates during
and after the crisis in each of these countries (see
Box 1 for methodological explanation). Table 2 shows
that while average growth before the Asian crisis
was at 7.3 per cent for Korea, around 8 per cent for
Indonesia and Thailand, and 9.6 per cent for Malaysia,
average growth over the 1997–2002 period was 4.5
per cent in Korea and 0.5 per cent in Indonesia.
Of course, the poorer economic performance
observed among these countries after the crisis
episode may not be attributed to the crisis alone. But
it is clearly the consensus that the crisis was the
preponderant factor behind it.
The biggest estimated absolute loss has been
incurred by Indonesia – of US$346 billion, where
actual output has remained far below its potential
level for several years, as clearly illustrated by 
Figure 1.
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Table 1 Cumulative output loss for each crisis country*
US$ billion As a proportion of 2002 GDP (%)
Indonesia 345.9 133
Korea 178.1 26
Malaysia 87.8 69
Thailand 305.2 157
Total 917.0 72
*Cumulative output loss over the 1997–2002 period.
Source Author’s elaboration, based on World Bank database.
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Figure 1 Indonesia: potential and actual GDP
Note Projected output for the years 1997–2002 based on output trend over the 1991–6 period. Values are in
US$ 1989, billion 
Data source World Bank database.
The full magnitude of the output loss was massive.
Indonesia experienced larger falls in output and
incomes during and after its crisis than that of the
USA in the Great Depression. As important, it is
estimated that the poverty headcount in Indonesia
doubled following the crisis: from 7–8 per cent in
1997 to 18–20 per cent in 1998 (Suryahadi et al.
2000).
The other Asian countries also witnessed major
output loss, mainly because (as was the case with
Indonesia) actual output by 2002 had not returned
to its potential level. This is the case even in Korea,
where economic recovery among all crisis-affected
countries has been the most robust, see Figure 2.
These estimates suggest that for 1997–2002, the
annual cost of the Asian crisis reached US$150 billion
(in 2002 US$). Such an estimate of the direct costs
of crises may seem rather high, but the order of
magnitude is similar to other estimates. See, for
example, Eichengreen (2004), who estimates that
over the last quarter of a century, currency and
banking crises have reduced incomes of developing
countries by around 25 per cent.
The estimate in Table 1 of US$917 billion for the
1997–2002 period may, in fact, underestimate total
costs associated with financial crises, as they do not
take account of either lower economic growth in
other Asian countries due to contagion effects via
the financial channel (e.g. Hong Kong, the
Philippines), or lower growth induced via the trade
channel, due, for example, to lower prices of exports
and declines in volumes of exports.
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Table 2 GDP growth rates 1991–2002 (%)
Average 1997* 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Average 
(1991–6)† (1997–2002)†
Indonesia 7.8 4.7 –13.1 0.8 4.9 3.4 3.7 0.5
Korea 7.3 5.0 –6.7 10.9 9.3 3.1 6.4 4.5
Malaysia 9.6 7.3 –7.4 6.2 8.5 0.3 4.1 3.0
Thailand 8.2 –1.4 –10.5 4.5 4.8 2.2 5.4 0.7
*Crisis year: Indonesia (July 1997); Korea (October 1997); Malaysia (September 1997); Thailand (July 1997).
†Geometric average.
Source Author’s elaboration, based on World Bank database.
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Figure 2 Korea: potential and actual GDP
Note Projected output for the years 1997–2002 based on output trend over the 1991–6 period. Values are in
US$ 1989, billion.
Data source World Bank database.
3 Sources of strength and weakness
3.1 Sources of strength – but with some caveats
There are many sources of strength and dynamism in
most of the East and South Asian economies, several
of which are summarised in Table 3.
Rapid growth
Overall, the Asian economies are strong, displaying
rapid economic growth, great dynamism of exports,
large trade surpluses and very high savings rates. This
is not only true for both China and India, but also for
most countries in East and South Asia. But this, in
itself, is no guarantee that financial crises will be
avoided in the future. The countries affected by the
Asian financial crisis in 1997 also had very high
growth rates, as well as very high savings rates. This
was an important and disturbing feature of the 1997
crisis compared with most previous financial crises in
developing countries.
In looking to the future, a key question is whether
such dynamism can be maintained, or whether any
slowdown of growth can be gradual and managed.
The extent to which growth depends not just on
external demand, but also on domestic demand,
would provide a potential source for stability of
growth; the latter is an issue that is increasingly being
discussed by policy makers in countries like China.
In the rest of Asia, domestic demand has played a
much greater role recently than it did in the past,
which is positive from this perspective (BIS 2005a).
The sustainability of domestic demand could be
helped by the fact that it was accompanied by
measures to boost private sector investment. For
example, in Korea, corporate restructuring has
implied that the debt/equity ratio in manufacturing
fell from around 400 per cent in 1997 to about 100
per cent in March 2004. In India, strong corporate
earnings underpin investment. The growth of bank
lending to households has also supported increased
domestic consumption (and can continue to do so).1
High levels of reserves
The second source of strength in preventing currency
crises is the extremely high levels of foreign
exchange reserves (see again Table 3). Indeed, at the
end of 2004, the total combined reserves of China,
Taiwan, Korea and India reached US$1.2 trillion,
which represents over 30 per cent of the world’s
foreign exchange reserves. It is noteworthy that over
US$300 billion of those reserves were accumulated
in 2004, as the pace of reserve accumulation had
built up since 2001 (Genberg et al. 2005).
Indeed, except for Indonesia and the Philippines, for
the countries listed in Table 3 (China, India, Thailand
and South Korea) foreign exchange reserves,
excluding gold, are much larger than total external
debt. Foreign exchange reserves are therefore – for
those countries – much larger than short-term debt,
whose non-renewal is most likely to be problematic
in provoking currency crises (Rodrik and Velasco
1999).
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Table 3 Macroeconomic indicators
Real GDP Foreign exchange Total external Debt-service 
growth (%) reserves excluding debt (US$ billion) ratio, paid (%)
gold (US$ billion)
03 04 05 03 04 05 03 04 05 03 04 05
China 9.3 9.5 * 408.2 614.5 * 193.6 229.6 * 7.3 6.2 *
India 8.6 6.9 * 98.9 126.6 * 113.5 118.6 * 19.6 10.7 *
South Korea 3.1 4.7 3.4 155.3 199.0 220.0 132.8 144.7 153.9 6.3 5.5 5.6
Thailand 6.9 6.1 4.0 41.1 48.7 50.3 51.8 50.8 49.4 15.3 9.7 10.3
Indonesia 4.9 5.1 5.0 35.0 35.0 33.7 134.4 137.4 140.5 25.6 16.3 12.3
Philippines 4.5 6.0 5.0 13.7 13.1 15.6 62.7 65.8 66.3 20.6 15.6 16.4
*No available data.
Source Economist Intelligence Unit (2005).
For China, Prasad and Wei (2005) estimate that
reserve holdings were ten times the level of short-
term debt, a much higher ratio than for other
developing countries.2 This is very reassuring. It should
be mentioned that the composition of capital inflows
has recently taken a less positive trend. Though a large
proportion of inflows into China take the form of
foreign direct investment (FDI) (and thus are probably
more stable), about 30–40 per cent of the increase in
the foreign exchange reserves in the past three years
is linked to ‘speculative’ capital inflows. These were
estimated to reach around US$120–160 billion from
2002–4 (Zhang 2005).3 These speculative or ‘hot
money’ inflows would seem to be chasing an
expected revaluation in the renminbi. Increases of
reserves originating in ‘hot money’ inflows are
significantly less healthy than those originating in
trade surpluses and FDI, as has occurred in the past in
China and in other Asian economies. It has been
argued that the scale of ‘hot money’ inflows would
have been even larger had there been no capital
controls. Therefore, these should not be lifted.
Furthermore, some Chinese scholars (e.g. Zhang
2005) have argued persuasively that the existence of
such large inflows of ‘hot money’ could even justify
temporarily strengthening capital controls on inflows
rather than liberalising them. Some variation on the
Chilean unremunerated reserve requirements (VRR or
encaje) could be an interesting option. The Chilean
encaje, imposed in times of surges (especially of short-
term capital), required a part of the inflow to be
deposited in the Central Bank, without
remunerations. This lowered the yield, and thus the
attractiveness of bringing money into Chile. As it was
applied only during the first year, it particularly
discouraged short-term inflows.
It is reassuring that Chinese reserves at the end of
2004 reached 53 weeks of imports that year, again
well above practically every other developing
country. There are, however, two aspects that
make China’s massive reserves look less excessive.
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Box 2 The cost of holding foreign exchange reserves
In many developing countries, holding high levels of foreign exchange reserves and sterilising them
does have quite significant costs, estimated for example at around 1 per cent of GDP in the first half
of the 1990s in several major Latin American countries (see Ffrench-Davis and Griffith-Jones 1994).
Genberg et al. (2005) estimate that for early 2004, the cost of sterilisation of reserves per year for
Korea and for India reached 0.5 per cent of GDP. This financial cost is due to the fact that reserves are
usually held in low-yielding US Treasury bills, whereas the bonds issued locally (to compensate for the
monetary impact) have higher costs.
However, for Taiwan, Singapore, China, Malaysia and Thailand, short-term interest rates are actually
below or at US levels, implying that the cost of sterilisation is either extremely low or even negative.
However, if these currencies are revalued in the future, the accumulated foreign reserves could imply
a significant fiscal loss (Zhang 2005).
Table 4 Total 2004 capital adequacy in Asia Pacific (%)
Thailand 12.6
Indonesia 19.4
Hong Kong 15.4
Philippines 18.6
Malaysia 14.2
Taiwan 10.7
Korea 12.1
Singapore 16.3
Source Moody’s (2005a), based on bank regulators in each country.
One is the reserve coverage of the monetary base
(defined as M2), which for China covers only about
20 per cent of M2. Should China fully liberalise its
capital account in the future (which we consider
both unlikely and undesirable in the short to
medium term) and become vulnerable to capital
flight or – more gradually – outflows by domestic
and foreign investors, the current level of reserves
does not seem so excessive. More relevant in the
current context, an additional reason given for high
levels of reserves (e.g. by Prasad and Wei 2005) is
the need to help cushion the banking sector from
shocks. If non-performing loans of the banks are
around 14 per cent of GDP in China, this is a large
proportion of total foreign exchange reserves.
Though it seems unlikely that even a very large
banking crisis (which is improbable) would require
such a massive recapitalisation, these comparisons
give some logic (in terms of ‘self-insurance’) to such
extremely large levels of foreign exchange reserves.
Holding such high levels of reserves, with the aim of
‘self-insurance’ in China and, to a lesser extent, in
other Asian countries, implies significant costs which
are onerous for developing countries, especially the
poorest ones. It would be far more efficient if there
were complementary mechanisms for ‘collective
insurance’. These could either be provided by the
international community, for example, via issuing
Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) (Griffith-Jones and
Ocampo 2003) or creating an International
Monetary Fund (IMF) facility for helping stop capital-
account crises (Cordella and Yeyati 2005), or through
regional mechanisms, such as building on the
Chiang-Mai Asian Initiative.
Before looking at the costs of holding such large
reserves, it is important to emphasise that ‘self-
insurance’ against crisis is not the only reason why
Asian countries hold such high levels of reserves. In
several cases, the wish to avoid excessive
strengthening of their currencies, which would
undermine competitiveness of their exports, is also a
very important factor.
To summarise, except for one or two of the
countries analysed, external vulnerability to crisis is
significantly lowered by extremely high reserves. This
could be particularly valuable if the international
cycle turns, credit spreads increase and terms of
trade deteriorate.
Strong fiscal situation and low inflation
Most Asian countries have relatively manageable
fiscal deficits to GDP; furthermore, average fiscal
deficits have been declining since 2001, when many
countries gave fiscal stimulus to boost domestic
demand. Nevertheless, fiscal deficits remain large in
India (where they have been above 9 per cent of
GDP in the 2002–4 period) and in the Philippines.
Inflation in the Asian countries analysed remains fairly
low, and inflation volatility has decreased in most
cases. Low inflation should give central banks more
flexibility in responding to external shocks. It also
tends to reduce risk premia for external borrowing.
3.2 Potential sources of weakness
The banking sector
As learned only too well in East Asia and elsewhere,
weak financial systems can either cause or deeply
accentuate crises originating in other causes. Asian
policy makers are aware of these risks and have
taken measures to reduce vulnerabilities, but
important challenges remain.
In Asia – more than elsewhere – economic and
systemic risks tend to be highly concentrated in the
banking sector, as capital markets are relatively
underdeveloped. This is particularly the case in China,
where the corporate bond market is very
underdeveloped, accounting for only 1 per cent of
corporate financing in 2004 (Moody’s 2005b). As a
result, long-term capital needs are often funded by
short-term bank lending, increasing liquidity and
interest risk in banks. As a consequence, one
important (albeit indirect) way of reducing
vulnerability of the banking system is to develop and
deepen local capital markets – not necessarily an easy
task. In particular, reform of China’s capital markets
has faced difficulties, which have implied that the
stock market has been falling for several years, even
though the economy is so dynamic.
In recent years, there has been quite a significant and
broad-based improvement in Asian banking. The
following points summarise the overall situation
outside of China.
z Bank profitability has tended to rise, especially in
2004. To an important extent, this can be
explained in countries like India by cyclical factors,
such as strong growth and declining long-term
interest rates (BIS 2005a; Sen 2005). In Korea,
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bank earnings have increased significantly, as
earlier problems with household credit (credit-
card related) eased.
z Overall, capital adequacy has also been improving
in Asia. For most major Asian countries (except
China), capital adequacy ratios are high, and well
above the 8 per cent minimum Basle ratio (Table
4), thus providing an important buffer against
shocks to the banking systems. Naturally, capital
adequacy measurements are never precise, and
are also subject to cyclical fluctuations.
z Non-performing loans (NPLs) have been reduced
in many East and South Asian countries, although
high NPLs remain an issue in the Philippines and
Thailand, as well as in China.
z Improvements in Asian banks’ performance
indicators have led to significant recent credit
ratings upgrades (see Moody’s 2005a). However,
as the BIS (2005a) rightly points out, this partly
reflects cyclical factors, which may be temporary.
Indeed, policy makers need to treat international
rating agencies’ evaluations with some caution, as
they are often very pro-cyclical, and as their
ratings were quite problematic before and during
the Asian crisis.
In spite of this performance, some remaining areas
of risk can be highlighted. The first is linked to
increased lending to consumers, regarded by banks
(especially foreign ones) as profitable and safe. If this
credit expands too quickly, and especially if
economies later slow down, this can lead to banking
problems. For example, credit card debt has begun
to expand rapidly in several Asian economies, and
non-payments created significant problems in Korea,
which are now being overcome. Mortgage loans are
apparently safer due to the collateral provided by
houses; however, rapid property price rises pose the
risk of reversal of prices, which can lead to increased
losses in mortgage lending. Negative wealth effects
of property price falls can depress total aggregate
demand and lead to further bank losses.
The measures taken by several Asian governments
(e.g. in Korea, China and Thailand) to dampen
property price increases are therefore well taken.
Similarly, the spreading of credit bureaus in Asia is
helpful for accessing borrowers’ credit worthiness.
A second area of risk for banking systems is currency
mismatches (BIS 2005a). Especially in Asia, currency
mismatches have fallen sharply at the national level,
as foreign currency debt fell in proportion to exports
and reserves. However, in some Asian countries,
private sector foreign currency mismatches are large;
such mismatches could pose risks to the banks if
sharp changes in exchange rates occurred.
More generally, as the Bank for International
Settlements (BIS 2005b) points out, ‘foreign
ownership exposes local banking systems more directly
to changes in global conditions’. Indeed, as the study
points out, changes in risk appetite or in business
strategy at the parent level can affect the level of
resources allocated to a specific country by the foreign
bank, including the possibility of total exit from the
country in bad times. This could be very negative if
foreign banks constitute a high proportion of the total
banking system. Furthermore, regulatory decision
making may migrate excessively to home countries,
leaving local supervisors insufficiently informed of
potential risks and with insufficient power to influence
subsidiaries and branches of foreign banks.
Third, the rising exposure of banks to government
bonds can lead to associated market risk. If long-
term interest rates rise, banks can have significant
losses. This could be particularly important in India as
the value of these bonds fall.
The banking system in China
One country in Asia where the banking system
remains somewhat fragile is China. It is very positive
that the government has made accelerated efforts
to strengthen the banking system, particularly by
recapitalising the state banks, but also by slowing
down excessive growth of bank lending, which has
reduced systemic risk. However, as discussed below,
several fragilities remain and new challenges are
opening up, so it seems desirable that policy makers
proceed cautiously with domestic financial
liberalisation and capital account liberalisation,
especially till the banking system is strengthened.
China’s banking system is, by most measures, large
(especially when compared with other developing
countries). For example, its ratio of credit to GDP is
almost double that of the average for Asian emerging
markets (Prasad et al. 2005). Despite the problems
and limitations discussed below, it has played a very
positive role in supporting Chinese economic growth.
This makes the banking system central to the Chinese
economy, and any serious disruption to it – and worse
still a crisis – particularly problematic.
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Chinese banks’ balance sheets shortcomings are
reflected in fairly low profitability by international
standards: after-tax returns for the large banks were
reported at only 0.4 per cent in 2003 (Moody’s
2005a). Good profitability offers a cushion against
adverse economic downturns and asset quality
deterioration. Without such a cushion, Chinese banks
are more vulnerable to external and internal shocks.
Furthermore, the Chinese banking system has a
combination of high NPLs, low capital adequacy
ratios (CARs) and low provisioning. These are
interrelated, as large NPLs create a need for
increased provisioning, which reduces profitability
and puts downwards pressure on CARs.
There has been significant progress in reducing
Chinese banks’ reported NPL ratios, but they still
remain high. Moody’s (2005b) estimates them at
over 13 per cent of GDP for 2005, significantly
lower than for 2002. However, they are estimated
to be the highest in Asia with the Philippines (13 per
cent) and Thailand (12 per cent) reportedly following
close behind, while Malaysia (7.5 per cent), Indonesia
(5.8 per cent) and Korea (1.6 per cent) have
significantly lower ratios. These figures may be an
underestimate of the true position. NPLs are difficult
to estimate and are often understated. For example,
some so-called ‘evergreen’ loans are difficult to
detect, as loan officers keep rolling them out to
keep the loan classed as ‘performing’, even though
the lender knows the principal is at significant risk.
Furthermore, Chinese banks are inadequately
capitalised. Though no official data seem to be
reported for the banking system as a whole, in 2003
most Chinese banks had CARs below the Basle
international minimum of 8 per cent. Also, if
compared with other Asian countries (see Table 4),
Chinese CARs are much lower. The large state banks
have seen their capital levels improve, thanks to large
recapitalisations by the government, and increasingly
by Initial Public Offerings (IPOs). Smaller banks,
however, are in a much more difficult situation. The
declining stock market makes it difficult for them to
issue equity.
A key source of support for the Chinese banking
system has been recapitalisation by the government.
Moody’s (2005b) estimates total public support till
now – via both the Ministry of Finance and the
Central Bank (People’s Bank of China) – at a
staggering US$259 billion (other sources have lower
estimates). It is widely expected that very strong
government support will continue even when banks
are privatised. Though very costly, this support is
extremely valuable to compensate for weaknesses in
Chinese banks.
As regards the future, the profitability of Chinese
banks could increase as banks diversify their lending
even more, for example, into loans to consumers or
fee-generating business such as wealth management.
However, loans to consumers also pose new risks; for
example, if a real estate bubble materialised, this
could add significant risks to Chinese banks. The fact
that China still has no centralised credit bureau,
except in Shanghai, could exacerbate risks from
mortgage lending though the proposed
establishment of such a bureau will be valuable.
There may be difficult trade-offs for the Chinese
authorities. Some of the measures to increase bank
profitability may imply, for example, closing branches
in remote rural regions, which may actually reduce
access to financial services for very poor people. It is
important that the necessary increase in bank
profitability is achieved in ways that do not harm the
poor, or that compensatory measures are taken to
protect them.
Perhaps the main risk for Chinese banks would be a
sharp reduction (or downturn) in Chinese economic
growth. At the moment, this seems very unlikely,
but in the longer term it is a concern that needs to
be taken account of. Decisions on capital account
liberalisation and on changes in exchange rate
regimes need to be extremely careful and gradual, so
as to avoid adding new sources of volatility and risk
on a still fragile banking system.
More immediately, planned liberalisation of interest
rates (especially of deposit rates) could damage
profitability of some banks. Therefore, it seems
important that such deregulation is carried out
gradually, as very rapid elimination of low deposit
rates could seriously impact already low profits.
Another immediate challenge for Chinese banks is
that – according to its WTO commitments – the
country will fully open its banking sector at the end
of 2006. This will have positive effects (such as
increases in efficiency and more modern risk
management). However, competition from foreign
banks could put additional pressure on still relatively
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1 However, an excessive expansion of household
credits could pose risks, as discussed later.
2 The BIS, based on official Chinese data, estimates
that Chinese reserves amount to six times the
level of short-term external debt, still above
comparable data for other countries.
3 Prasad and Wei (2005) assume an even higher
ratio for 2003. Other sources, e.g. Genberg et al.
(2005), have lower estimates for ‘hot money’
inflows into China – a new phenomenon that is
difficult to measure.
weak Chinese banks, especially if domestic banks are
left with less creditworthy firms, as the most
creditworthy ones become clients of foreign banks.
Increased foreign participation, however, seems to
be likely to be gradual and partial. This could also
limit the risk of liquidity problems in domestic banks,
should Chinese depositors shift their money into
foreign banks, for example, due to safety concerns.
This could pose threats to Chinese banks in the
medium to long term.
4 Policy priorities
Overall, Asian growth has been very dynamic for a
long time. This has enabled the levels of poverty
reduction unseen in other parts of the world. The
extent of poverty reduction in Asia is absolutely
unique in history. This gives rise to a first and general
line of advice. In areas where Asian economies are
(and have been) strong, they should build on those
strengths. When there is a contradiction between
national perceptions based on accumulated
experience and foreign advice, it would seem better
to give greater weight to national ideas, especially
those not influenced by vested interests.
At this broad level, it also seems reasonable to be
prudent in introducing changes, and to do so
gradually. The area of liberalisation of the capital
account seems to be a good example, especially for
successful countries with weak banking systems like
China. Any benefits, in terms of attracting additional
capital (which is much less necessary given high
domestic savings rates) or providing more depth,
liquidity and expertise to the domestic capital
market, need to be carefully weighed against
possible increased costs and risks. In particular, the
risks of financial and currency crises must be
minimised. Indeed, in a recent speech (26 October
2005) at the Seventh Meeting of the Institute of
International Finance (IIF)’s Asian CEO Summit,
Deputy Governor of the Chinese Central Bank,
Xiang Jumbo, stressed that as ‘global financial
integration is strengthened, cross-border contagion
effects of financial risks will be increased as well’.
On the specific issue of capital account liberalisation,
it is interesting to note that there is wide support for
great prudence for China. Thus, the head of the
China Division at the IMF said in 2004 that ‘given
the weaknesses in the financial sector, I think that
maintaining capital controls or even selectively
tightening them may be very important in terms of
protecting the weak financial sector from external
pressures …’ (Prasad 2004).
As regards domestic financial liberalisation, again
prudence seems necessary, especially in relation to
weak banking sectors. One priority area for action is
the development of domestic capital markets,
especially domestic bond markets. When modifying
financial systems and adapting them to the needs of
more market-orientated economies, it is also
important to preserve features that have been positive,
such as support for corporate investment and growth
(provided those corporations are efficient). It also seems
crucial to strengthen regulation and supervision.
An important way of preventing crises is to
constantly follow prudent macroeconomic policies.
This has typically been the case in East and South
Asia, and it has served the region well. But where
fiscal deficits (e.g. India) and/or external debt service
ratios (e.g. the Philippines) are too high, it seems
important to implement measures to reduce them.
However much is done to be prudent and to build
defences, there will always be the risk of crises – or
even of large slowdowns – in all economies. As a
consequence, establishing good social safety nets
seems a useful precaution.
Finally, strengthening regional and multilateral
mechanisms for crisis prevention and better
management remains a priority (see, for example,
WESS 2005).
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